Climate Adaptation Policy at the Continental Level: Natural Resources in North America and Europe by Kibel, Paul Stanton
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 2 Spring 2010
International Climate Change Mitigation and
Adaptation Post-Copenhagen
Article 3
April 2010
Climate Adaptation Policy at the Continental
Level: Natural Resources in North America and
Europe
Paul Stanton Kibel
Golden Gate University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul Stanton Kibel, Climate Adaptation Policy at the Continental Level: Natural Resources in North
America and Europe, 27 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 473 (2010)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/3
KIBEL 
 
473 
ARTICLE 
 
Climate Adaptation Policy at the  
Continental Level:  
Natural Resources in North America and Europe 
PAUL STANTON KIBEL  
I. INTRODUCION: COMING TO TERMS 
As the field of climate change law and policy has evolved over 
the past decade, new terminology has also emerged.  Two 
concepts that have garnered considerable attention are “climate 
proofing” and “climate policy coherence.” 
The concept of climate proofing is based on the recognition 
that, regardless of whether we will be able to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions in the future, climate change is occurring 
now and due to past GHG emissions, levels will continue to occur 
in the coming decades.1  This reality calls for adapting our built 
environment, protected natural resources, as well as laws and 
 
 Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law (San Francisco, 
California), LL.M, Boalt Hall Law School, University of California at Berkeley; 
B.A., Colgate University. Of counsel to and former partner with water and 
natural resources group at Fitzgerald Abbott & Beardsley.  Editor of Rivertown: 
Rethinking Urban Rivers (MIT Press) and author of The Earth on Trial: 
Environmental Law on the International Stage (Routledge). The article expands 
on the author’s comments to the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) of the 
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation in conjunction 
with JPAC’s Climate Policy Coherence in North America workshop (held in 
Denver, Colorado on June 22, 2009). 
 1. GROUP ON WATER AND CLIMATE, GUIDANCE TOWARDS CLIMATE PROOFING OF 
WATER MANAGEMENT 1 (2007).  
The Guidance builds on the notion that climate change is a reality; the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its latest 
assessment report concluded that the global climate is in fact changing, 
and this change will affect the hydrological cycle and thus water 
availability as well as water services.  Adaptation to a certain degree of 
climate change is therefore inevitable.  
Id.  
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policies to account for climate change consequences.  Europe’s 
Task Force on Water and Climate described climate proofing as 
the “methodology to asses the resilience of water management 
and water services to cope with climate change.”2  A more 
extensive definition of climate proofing was set forth in the Asian 
Development Bank’s 2005 report, Climate Proofing: A Risk-Based 
Approach to Adaptation: 
[A] shorthand term for identifying risks to a development 
project, or any other specified natural or human asset, as a 
consequences of climate variability and change, and 
ensuring that those risks are reduced to acceptable levels 
through long-lasting and environmentally sound, 
economically viable, and socially acceptable changes. . .3 
Climate proofing posits that we can avoid some of the more dire 
adverse effects of sea level rise, increased evaporation of surface 
freshwater and elevated temperatures through appropriate 
modification of how we manage land and water resources. 
The concept of climate policy coherence proposes that more 
integrated strategic cooperation between different governmental 
entities—including different countries—is a critical component to 
making progress on both GHG emissions reduction and improved 
climate proofing.  For instance, in June 2009, the North American 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) hosted a 
regional workshop in Denver, Colorado titled Climate Policy 
Coherence in North America.  The June 2009 NACEC workshop 
evaluated, among other things, whether there were adequate 
bilateral and trilateral governance structures in place for 
Canada, Mexico and the United States to effectively coordinate 
climate adaptation strategies for cross-border resources such as 
international rivers.4  Similarly, in January 2009, the 
Partnership for European Environmental Research (PEER) 
released its report, Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and 
Governance, which noted the ways in which continent-wide 
European Union (EU) programs impact climate proofing efforts: 
 
 2. Id. at 2 (on file with author). 
 3. ASIAN DEV. BANK, CLIMATE PROOFING: A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO 
ADAPTATION xii (2005) (on file with author). 
 4. The author attended and participated in the June 2009 NACEC 
workshop. Workshop materials indicating title on filed with author. 
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If adaptation to climate change is to be integrated into 
policies that affect agriculture or water, the EU level has to 
be included because the Common Agricultural Policy and 
the Water Framework Directive set vital frameworks in 
these fields.5 
This article assesses the extent to which the concepts of 
climate proofing and climate policy coherence have found 
expression in continental natural resource regimes established in 
North America and Europe.  The article first examines the 
recognition of these concepts within three North American cross-
border regimes directly impacted by climate change: the Waters 
Treaty between Mexico and the United States; the Pacific Salmon 
Treaty between Canada and the United States; and the North 
American Waterfowl Management Plan between Canada, Mexico 
and the United States.  Next it considers the extent to which 
these concepts are reflected in recent European initiatives related 
to water resources, transboundary watercourses and the Danube 
River Basin.  The article concludes with a comparative assess-
ment as to why the pace and scope of continental climate 
adaptation policy in North America and Europe has differed. 
II. NORTH AMERICA’S CROSS-BORDER NATURAL 
RESOURCE REGIMES: SLOW TO ADAPT 
A. Mexico-United States Waters Treaty and Colorado 
River Flow 
The 1944 Waters Treaty between Mexico and the United 
States allocates the waters of the Colorado River, as well as the 
Rio Grande and Tijuana River.6  The Mexico-United States 
allocation of the Colorado River—which allocates 1.5 million-acre 
feet (MAF) annually to Mexico—was premised on the hydrological 
assumption of just over 16 MAF annual flows.7  Domestically, 
pursuant to the 1922 Colorado River Compact, the United States 
has allocated 14 MAF between “Upper Basin” states (Colorado, 
 
 5. P’SHIP FOR EUROPEAN ENVTL. RESEARCH, CLIMATE POLICY INTEGRATION, 
COHERENCE AND GOVERNANCE 67-68 (2009) (on file with author). 
 6. Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio 
Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter 1944 Waters Treaty]. 
 7. Id. at 55. 
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New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) and “Lower Basin” states 
(Arizona, California and Nevada).8  The 1944 Waters Treaty 
provides that, in the event the United States is unable to meet its 
1.5 MAF Colorado River delivery obligation to Mexico due to 
“extraordinary drought” conditions (a term not defined in the 
treaty), the matter can be referred to the International Boundary 
and Water Commission (IBWC) to try to forge a resolution.9 
It is now recognized that the 16 MAF total annual flow, that 
provided the basis for the Colorado River provisions in the 1944 
Waters Treaty, was flawed due to the sample years relied upon 
for the Mexico-United States allocation.  More specifically, the 
early 20thCentury data relied upon to support the 16 MAF flow 
turned out to be the result of particularly wet years.10  In 1965, it 
was reported that the Colorado River’s reliable natural flow was 
14% less than assumed, and more recent reports estimate that 
average flows were 22% less and the 16 MAF premise may have 
overestimated the long-term flow by 2 MAF.11 
To date, the on-river storage provided by Lake Mead (behind 
Hoover Dam) and Lake Powell (behind Glen Canyon Dam) has 
provided sufficient additional water supplies such that the United 
States has so far been able to meet its Colorado River water 
delivery obligations to Mexico.  Yet, as a Fall 2008 report by the 
Water Education Foundation’s Colorado River Project explained, 
the drought conditions over the past decade have now begun to 
severely test the Colorado River allocation regime: “A year ago, 
the Colorado River Basin was enduring the seventh dry year of 
the past eight.  Inflow into Lake Powell was 68 percent of average 
and combined storage of Powell and Lake Mead was roughly 50 
percent of capacity.”12  Similarly, in a March 2009 article in High 
Country News magazine, special counsel John Carlson to the 
Colorado River Water Conservation District observed: “Lake 
Meade and Lake Powell provide the backup capacity that ensures 
 
 8. Colorado River Compact, 1922, available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/ 
pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf. 
 9. 1944 Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 6. 
 10. Matt Jenkins, How Low Will It Go?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 2, 2009, 
at 12; JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, DEAD POOL: LAKE POWELL, GLOBAL WARMING 
AND THE FUTURE OF WATER IN THE WEST 7 (2008). 
     11.  Id. 
     12. Sue McClurg, Colo. River Project, How is the Colorado River Shortage 
Agreement Working?, RIVER REPORT 11 (2008). 
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enough water . . . After nearly a decade of drought, the reservoirs 
are half-empty.  If they continue to drop that will touch off a fight 
over what little water is in the river, like creditors battling over 
the carcass of a bankrupt company . . . .”13 
The drought conditions over the past decade prompted the 
United States Department of the Interior to adopt the Colorado 
River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the 
Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Colorado 
River Interim Guidelines) in December 2007, to address the 
allocation of diminished Colorado River water supplies between 
Arizona, California and Nevada.14  However, the Colorado River 
Interim Guidelines did not address the question of whether 
deliveries to Mexico pursuant to the 1944 Waters Treaty might be 
affected as a result of such drought-related shortages. 
Against this backdrop, there are now indications that what 
has been referred to as “drought” conditions over the past decade 
can be explained in part as a manifestation of the effects of 
climate change on the Colorado River basin hydrology.  A review 
of the science to date on this question was provided by James 
Lawrence Powell, Executive Director of the National Physical 
Science Consortium at the University of Southern California.  In 
his 2008 book Dead Pool: Lake Powell, Global Warming and the 
Future of Water in the West (published by University of 
California Press), Powell reports: 
Higher temperatures obviously cause more and faster 
melting, but does not the same amount of meltwater flow 
downstream, only sooner?  Evidently not.  Warmer 
temperatures not only melt snow, they cause it to 
sublimate—to pass directly from solid into vapor without 
going through the liquid phase.  Think of clouds of carbon 
dioxide vapor streaming from a block of dry ice.  Water 
vapor from subliminated snow wafts away on the wind, to 
condense and rain somewhere, just not necessarily in the 
river basin where it originated.15 
. . . . 
 
     13. Jenkins, supra note 10, at 14. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. POWELL, supra note 10, at 21-22. 
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The climate models portray a twenty-first century Colorado 
River basin that is hotter but no wetter.  Warmer 
temperatures not only reduce the size of the snowpack and 
cause it to melt sooner, they increase evaporation from 
snow and soils, as well as transpiration from plant leaves 
(together called evapotranspiration).  Setting aside the 
relatively small percentage of rainfall that sinks into the 
soil, runoff is essentially the difference between 
precipitation and evapotranspiration. . .16 
. . . . 
If precipitation remains constant while evapotranspiration 
increases by just 2 percent, runoff decline by nearly 14 
percent.  If precipitation falls by 1 percent and evapo-
transpiration increases by the same 2 percent, runoff dips 
by 22 percent.  Thus not only is the water balance in the 
Colorado River basin poised on a razor’s edge between 
supply and demand, even a tiny increase in 
evapotranspiration causes a multiplied and dangerous 
decrease in runoff.17 
. . . . 
Assimilating these different studies, one would certainly be 
justified in assuming that global warming will reduce 
runoff in the Colorado River by 20 percent by mid-century.  
To assume no reduction would be imprudent or worse.18 
James Lawrence Powell’s observations coincide with the 
conclusion reached in a 2007 report by the National Academy of 
Sciences-National Research Council (NRC), titled Colorado River 
Basin Water Management: Evaluating and Adjusting to 
Hydroclimatic Variability.  The NRC report determined that 
“warmer regional temperatures and the specter of recurrent 
drought points to a future in which the potential for conflict 
among existing and prospective new users will prove endemic.”19 
Within the context of the IBWC and Mexico-United States 
diplomatic relations, the question of adapting the Colorado River 
 
 16. Id. at 179. 
 17. Id. at 180. 
 18. Id. at 181. 
 19. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT: 
EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY (2007). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/3
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binational regime to reflect climate change impacts has been 
raised obliquely in recent years.  In August 2007, a Joint Mexico-
United States Statement on Lower Colorado River Issues was 
released.  This Joint Statement provided: “authorities from both 
nations agree that the IBWC, a treaty-based bilateral 
organization with over a century of successful collaboration, 
should be utilized to expedite discussions in coming weeks to 
further Colorado River cooperation.  Among the issues expected 
to be addressed are . . . continued needs of both nations for water 
for urban, agricultural and environmental purposes, the study of 
the hydrological system and potential impacts of climate change, 
including the effects of the ongoing historic Colorado River 
drought. . . .”20 
In March 2008, the IBWC announced new Terms of 
Reference for Mexico-United States Joint Cooperative Actions—
Colorado River Users.  In these Terms of Reference, one of 
Mexico’s listed “objectives” is “Evaluation of current 
climatological conditions and future shortage conditions” and one 
of the United States listed “objectives” is to “Evaluate potential 
climate change impacts on Colorado River hydrology.”21  
According to persons directly involved in the IBWC Terms of 
Reference process, to date climate change effects and adaptation 
have not been considered as autonomous issues but rather have 
been addressed under the broader umbrella of discussions 
relating to chronic long-term drought and water supply 
shortages.22 
Finally, in January 2009, former United States Secretary of 
the Department of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne and Mexico’s 
Ambassador to the United States Arturo Saruukhan issued a 
Joint Declaration on Colorado River Issues. This Joint 
Declaration stated: 
 
 20. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Kempthorne 
Announces Joint U.S.-Mexico Statement on Lower Colorado River Issues (Aug. 
13, 2007) (emphasis added). 
 21. International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S. & Mex., Terms of 
Reference: United States-Mexico Joint Cooperative Actions-Colorado River 
Users (Mar. 11, 2008) (unpublished document, on file with author) (emphasis 
added). 
 22. Telephone Conversation with Jennifer Pitt, Senior Resource Analyst, 
Environmental Defense Fund (Sept. 2009). 
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Whereas recent periods of historic drought in the Colorado 
River Basin and growing recognition of the potential 
adverse impacts of climate change have stimulated efforts 
to identify cooperative and innovative approaches to ensure 
that the Colorado River allotment of each nations will 
continue to meet the needs of both nations . . . Secretary 
Dirk Kempthorne and Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan 
hereby applaud the efforts of the IBWC and its work to 
help identify cooperative and innovative measures that 
both countries could implement consistent with the 
provisions of the 1944 Treaty to help ensure that the 
Colorado River is able to continue to meet the needs of both 
nations and . . . Further, both government support these 
efforts to identify innovative opportunities for water 
conservation, storage, supply augmentation, and 
environmental protection, which are viewed as 
complementary to the mission of the Department of the 
Interior and the respective Mexican ministries, consistent 
with the provisions of the 1944 Treaty.23 
The December 2007 Joint Statement, the March 2008 Terms 
of Reference and the January 2009 Joint Declaration all mention 
the potential impacts of climate change on Colorado River 
hydrology, but it remains to be seen whether these brief 
references will translate into a substantive dialogue regarding 
the terms and operation of the 1944 Waters Treaty allocation 
regime. 
Based on positions set forth by the United States in the 
context of previous efforts to address Colorado River supply 
shortages, there remain some grounds for skepticism as to 
whether such a substantive bilateral dialogue on climate change 
effects will be forthcoming, at least on the United States’ side.  
More specifically, in 2004 the United States Department of the 
Interior prepared a Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
for a proposed Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation 
Program.  Although comments on the Draft EIS for this program 
faulted the analysis for failing to take into account anticipated 
climate change-related impacts on Colorado River basin 
 
 23. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Kempthorne, Mexican 
Ambassador Sarukhan Sign Declaration Commending On-Going Partnership in 
the Management of the Colorado River (Jan. 15, 2009) (emphasis added). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/3
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hydrology, the United States Department of the Interior 
responded as follows: 
Reclamation [the Bureau of Reclamation, a subagency of 
the United States Department of the Interior] believes that 
the use of actual data recorded over the past century 
provides the best basis for ongoing Colorado River 
management activities . . . If Reclamation were to use a 
different modeling approach .  .  . it would conflict with all 
of the other Colorado River management actions and 
analyses that Reclamation has taken and is currently 
taken.  Attempting to predict global changes in climate, 
shifts in demographic patterns, and other factors affecting 
Colorado River hydrology are far more speculative than 
Reclamation’s reliance on actual annual hydrological data.24 
The dismissive approach towards climate change impacts 
reflected in the 2004 EIS for the Lower Colorado River Multi-
Species Conservation Program has changed somewhat in more 
recent years.  In 2007, the United States Department of the 
Interior approved the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for 
Lower Basin Shortage and the Coordinated Operations for Lake 
Powell and Lake Mead (Lower Basin Shortage Interim 
Guidelines).25  In the 2007 EIS that accompanied the final Lower 
Basin Shortage Interim Guidelines, the question of climate 
change effects on Colorado River flow was given more substantive 
consideration.26  As reported in a January 2009 article by Carly 
Jerla and Jim Prairie of the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation: 
Acknowledging and responding to the potential impacts of 
climate change and increased hydrologic variability, [the 
Bureau of] Reclamation empanelled a group of leading 
climate expects during the Interim Guidelines development 
process.  The Climate Technical Work Group assessed the 
state of knowledge regarding climate change in the Basin 
 
 24. Carly Jerla & Jim Prairie, Lower Colorado River Multi-Species 
Conservation Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement/Environmental Impact Report, in DEAD POOL: LAKE POWELL, GLOBAL 
WARMING AND THE FUTURE OF WATER IN THE WEST 182 (2008). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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and prioritized future research and development objectives.  
Their findings and recommendations were published as an 
appendix to the Final EIR (Appendix U) and are soon to be 
re-published, with no change in content, as a stand-alone 
report.  The recommendation of the Work Group was to 
include a qualitative discussion of climate change and 
variability accompanied by a quantitative sensitivity 
analysis using paleoclimate evidence. This became 
Appendix N of the Final EIS.27 
In the context of the EIS prepared for the Lower Basin 
Shortage Interim Guidelines, the formation of a Climate 
Technical Working Group and the inclusion of Appendix N and 
Appendix U suggest a greater willingness to recognize the 
potential effects of climate change on Colorado River hydrology.  
However, even in this instance, this recognition did not translate 
into proposals for actual climate adaptation measures.  The Final 
EIS for the Lower Basin Shortage Interim Guidelines did not 
factor Appendix N’s climate change modeling and projections into 
its alternatives analysis or recommendations, explaining: “Based 
on the current inability to precisely project future impacts of 
climate change . . . this final EIS is based on the re-sampled 
historical record.”28 
The United States’ increasing willingness to acknowledge 
potential climate impacts in the water sector was also evidenced 
by the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s 2008 report 
titled National Water Program Strategy: Response to Climate 
Change.29  This publication recognized that “in some parts of the 
country, drought, changing patterns of precipitation and 
snowmelt, and increased water loss due to evaporation as a result 
of warmer air temperatures will result in changes to the 
 
 27. Carly Jerla & Jim Prairie, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower 
Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake 
Mead & Efforts Addressing Climate Change and Variability, INTERMOUNTAIN 
WEST CLIMATE SUMMARY, Jan. 2009, at 5-7. 
 28. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION UPPER AND LOWER 
COLO. REGIONS, RECLAMATION: MANAGING WATER IN THE WEST, FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR 
LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND 
LAKE MEAD 9, 14 (2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/ 
strategies/FEIS/index.html. 
 29. EPA, NATIONAL WATER PROGRAM STRATEGY: RESPONSE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2008). 
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availability of water for drinking and for use for agriculture and 
industry”30 and that “limited water availability and drought in 
some regions will require drinking water providers to reassess 
supply facility plans and consider alternative pricing, allocation 
and water conservation options.”31  The 2008 National Water 
Program Strategy report, however, was fairly tentative and vague 
in regard to proposed responses to these water sector impacts.  Its 
“action” items provided: 
The National Water Program will explore opportunities 
with States and drinking water systems to better address 
expected impacts of climate change on water supply and 
water usage rates through water conservation and water 
resources management.32 
. . . . 
The National Water Program will promote technologies to 
identify and address leakage from water pipes and other 
conveyances.33 
. . . . 
The National Water Program will work to publish a 
document describing a process through which utilities can 
conduct a self-analysis of sustainability, including a 
climate-change specific vulnerability analysis.34 
These action items are thin on specifics, in terms of what the 
federal government will do and when.  Moreover, and signif-
icantly, the 2008 National Water Program report makes no 
mention of the Colorado River specifically, or of the need for 
potential changes in the way interstate and international rivers 
(such as the Colorado) are allocated.  This does not suggest that 
examination of climate adaptation in the Mexico-United States 
Colorado River regime is presently a priority for the United 
States. 
Professor and water law scholar Dan Tarlock has discussed 
some of the reasons that international water allocations regimes 
 
 30. Id. at ii. 
 31. Id. at 12. 
 32. Id. at 28. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 49. 
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(such as the Mexico-United States Colorado River regime) may 
face difficulty adapting to climate change impacts.35  In his law 
review article, entitled How Well Can International Water 
Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change?, Tarlock 
posits that such adaptation may be hindered by the international 
regime’s lack of flexibility in terms of adjusting water allocations 
fixed pursuant to treaty provisions, and by the fact that treaty 
provisions usually subordinate ecosystem/instream protection to 
water development and usage concerns.36  Tarlock’s analysis 
helps to explain why there has to date been reluctance to directly 
address the impacts of climate change on the existing United 
States-Mexico Colorado River regime, but also underscores that 
there are compelling reasons why this reluctance should 
nonetheless be overcome. 
Should Mexico and the United States prove willing to look 
more closely at how climate change will affect the bilateral 
allocation regime established for the Colorado River, a fruitful 
starting point for this examination might be the “extraordinary 
drought” provisions under the 1944 Waters Treaty.37  These 
treaty provisions establish the process and criteria to address 
situations where climatic conditions prevent the United States 
from delivering the specified 1.5 MAF of Colorado Water to 
Mexico.38  In the context of rising temperatures and greater 
evaporation resulting from climate change, the “extraordinary 
drought” conditions that have occurred over the past decade may 
simply be symptomatic of the new “ordinary” conditions.  A 2009 
study by the North American Center for Transboundary Studies 
reported: 
Both droughts and floods may become more extreme as a 
result of global climate change.  In 2009, the Border 
Governors Conference committed to a binational drought 
science workshop.  In this workshop, experts modeled the 
effects of climate change on local hydrological cycles.  These 
models suggest longer, deeper droughts in the southwest of 
the United States and in the west of Mexico in the future.  
 
 35. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes 
Adapt to Global Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 423 (2000). 
 36. Id. at 423-24. 
 37. 1944 Waters Treaty, supra note 6, art. 2. 
 38. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/3
 2010] CLIMATE ADAPTATION POLICY 485 
Some models show the U.S. missing its treaty water 
delivery obligation to Mexico on the Colorado River for two 
thirds of the remaining years in the century.39 
This suggests that modifications to the existing bilateral Colorado 
River allocation regime may be needed to better reflect the 
current climate-induced hydrological realities. 
 B. Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty and 
Coldwater Fisheries 
The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, between Canada and the 
United States, seeks to deter overfishing of regional salmon 
stocks through a system of allocated fishing rights.40  This bi-
national fishing rights allocation scheme was deemed necessary 
because salmon originating in the rivers/streams of Canada often 
spend a significant part of their lifecycle feeding and growing in 
the off-shore ocean waters of the United States and vice-versa.41  
Recognizing that salmon fishing can take place in both waters 
and inland rivers/streams, the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty 
focused less on defining whether particular salmon stocks are 
“Canadian” or “American” and more on working to ensure that 
overall fishing levels were sustainable and that fishing rights 
were equitably allocated (based in large part on the location of 
the inland rivers/stream where salmon originated) between the 
two nations.42  This origination focus was reflected in Article 
III(1)(b) of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, which provides for 
“each party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of 
salmon originating in its waters.”43  The governing body 
 
 39. N. Am. Ctr. for Transboundary Studies, Memo on Water, in RETHINKING 
THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER: SEEKING COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS TO COMMON 
PROBLEMS 25 (2009). 
 40. See generally Treaty between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States Concerning Pacific Salmon, U.S.-Can., Jan. 28, 
1985, State Dep’t No. 98-149, 1998 WL 646161  [hereinafter 1985 Pacific Salmon 
Treaty], available at http://www.psc.org/pubs/treaty.pdf. 
 41. M.P. SHEPARD & A.W. ARGUE, THE 1985 PACIFIC SALMON TREATY: SHARING 
CONSERVATION BURDENS AND BENEFITS 96-119 (2005). 
 42. Id. 
 43. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 40, art. III. 
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established to implement the agreement is the Pacific Salmon 
Commission.44 
Although the negotiations of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty 
understood the essential role that river/stream habitat plays in 
the lifecycle of salmon (and therefore the abundance and 
productivity of salmon stocks), the issue of habitat conservation 
was not directly addressed in the initial agreement.45  The 1999 
Agreement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty was adopted, in part, to 
foster improved habitat conservation measures in Canada and 
the United States.46 
Over the past decade, an increased body of scientific 
literature has addressed the question of climate change impacts 
on North American salmon fisheries.47  Much of this literature 
has focused on how increasing air temperatures affect the 
temperature in river/stream habitat where salmon spawn and 
migrate, and the corresponding impact of such higher 
river/stream temperatures on salmon stock reproduction and 
survival rates.48 
For instance, in May 2002 the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) and Defenders of Wildlife co-authored report 
titled Effects of Global Warming on Trout and Salmon in U.S. 
Streams.49  This report found: 
Because trout and salmon are known to be intolerant of 
warm water, their distribution and/or abundance could be 
 
 44. Id. at 5.     
 45. EUGENE H. BUCK, THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY: THE 1999 AGREEMENT AND 
RENEGOTIATION OF ANNEX IV 20 (2007). 
 46. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 40, at 121. 
 47. See generally PATTY GLICK, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, FISH OUT OF WATER: A 
GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING AND PACIFIC NORTHWEST RIVERS (2005), available at 
http://www.nwf.org/News-and-Magazines/Media-Center/News-by-Topic/Global-
Warming/2005/~/media/PDFs/Global%20Warming/Fish_Out_of_Water_2005_FI
NAL.ashx; KIRKMAN O’NEAL, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & NRDC, EFFECTS OF 
GLOBAL WARMING ON TROUT AND SALMON IN U.S. STREAMS  (2002) [hereinafter 
EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING ON TROUT AND SALMON], available at 
http://www.defenders.org/resources/publications/programs_and_policy/science_a
nd_economics/global_warming/effects_of_global_warming_on_trout_and_salmon.
pdf; JAMES BATTIN ET AL., PROJECTED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON SALMON 
HABITAT RESTORATION (2007). 
 48. The author generally refers to all of the sources in the previous citation.   
 49. See generally EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING ON TROUT AND SALMON, supra 
note 47. 
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threatened if future climate change warms the streams 
they inhabit . . . We find that trout and salmon habitat is 
indeed vulnerable to the effects of global warming.  Based 
on emissions scenarios A1 and A2 from the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) we estimate that 
individual species of trout and salmon could lose 5-17% of 
their existing habitat by the year 2030, 14-34% by 2060 
and 21-42% by 2090, depending on the species considered 
and model used . . . Projected effects on trout and salmon 
are lower for IPCC emissions B1 and B2 . . . For these 
scenarios, we estimate habitat losses of 4-20% by 2030, 7-
31% by 2060, and 14-36% by 2090, depending on fish 
species and model.50 
The May 2002 NRDC-Defenders of Wildlife report went on to 
conclude: 
This study supports an abundant scientific literature in 
concluding that highly-valued cold water fisheries are 
vulnerable to severe losses of habitat from the warming of 
streams.  We estimate that 18-38% of presently suitable 
stream locations would become unsuitable for all trout and 
salmon by the year 2090.  Projected losses occur for all of 
the eight species modeled, and across all regions of the U.S. 
with existing cold water habitat.  Estimated losses are 
substantial, regardless of the general circulation model or 
emissions scenarios used for the calculations.51 
As another example, in April 2007, scientists with the United 
States National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
Fisheries Service Center and the University of Washington 
published a study with the National Academy of Sciences, titled 
Projected Impacts on Climate Change in Salmon Habitat 
Restoration, showing how global warming could result in a 20-
40% decline in Chinook salmon populations by 2050 for the State 
of Washington’s Snohomish River Basin.52  This NOAA-
University of Washington study also found that habitat 
deterioration resulting from climate change is likely to make 
 
 50. Id. at 3. 
 51. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
 52. BATTIN ET AL., supra note 47. 
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salmon recovery more difficult throughout the Pacific Northwest, 
particularly in higher elevation basins.53 
The 1999 Agreement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty 
establishes a framework that could enable Canada and the 
United States to better collaborate on adaptation policies relating 
to the adverse impact of climate change on salmon habitat.  
Attachment D under the 1999 Agreement on the Pacific Salmon 
Treaty is titled Renewed Cooperation on Scientific and 
Institutional Matters, and provides: 
[R]ecognizing the advantages of consultation and 
cooperation on science and information exchanged . . . 
Recognizing the benefits of processes for getting 
information for management, including the development of 
common assessment model . . . The Government of Canada 
and the Government of United States agree to . . . (d) 
request the Commission [Pacific Salmon Commission] to 
eliminate the Committee on Research and Statistics and to 
reconstitute itself as the Committee on Scientific 
Cooperation . . . (i) assist in the consultation with the 
scientific and technical committees of the Commission in 
setting the scientific agenda for the Commission, including 
identifying emerging issues and subject for research and 
monitoring progress . . . (iv) undertake the tasks assigned 
to it in the agreement on Habitat and Restoration . . . .54 
Attachment E under the 1999 Agreement on Pacific Salmon 
Treaty is titled Habitat and Restoration, and provides: 
Recognizing that protection and restoration of salmon 
habitat and maintenance of adequate water quality and 
quantity are vital to achieving improved spawning success, 
safe passage of adult and juvenile salmon, and therefore, 
optimum production of naturally spawning stocks . . . the 
Parties agree . . . (1) To use their best efforts, consistent 
with applicable law, to (1) protect and restore habitat so as 
to promote safe passage and adult and juvenile salmon and 
achieve high levels of natural productions . . . (b) maintain 
and, as needed, improve safe passage of salmon to and from 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 40, art. XV, IV, ch. 7, Attachment 
E (emphasis added). 
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their natal streams, and (c) maintain adequate water 
quality and quantity . . . (2) to promote these objectives by 
requesting the Commission [Pacific Salmon Commission] to 
report annually to the Parties on . . . (b) non-fishing factors 
affecting the safe passage of salmon as well as the survival 
of juvenile salmon . . . (c) options for addressing non-fishing 
constraints and restoring optimum production . . . (3) The 
Committee on Scientific Cooperation, when constituted, 
shall in consultation with the scientific and technical 
committees of the Pacific Salmon Commission (the 
“Commission”) provide advice to the Commission for 
referral to the Parties regarding non-fishing factors 
affecting the safe passage and optimum production of 
salmon.55 
Because adaptation of salmon habitat policies to rising 
climate-induced water temperatures qualifies as an “emerging 
issue” meriting closer scientific assessment, and because climate-
induced rising water temperatures qualifies as a “non-fishing 
factor/constraint” affecting the production and survival of salmon 
stocks, such matters fall within the scope of Attachment D and E 
to the 1999 Agreement on the Pacific Salmon Treaty.  Such 
matters could be made a priority by the Committee on Scientific 
Cooperation which in turn could advise the Pacific Salmon 
Commission on what steps Canada and the United States should 
take to address these concerns. 
There have been calls for the bilateral institutions of the 
Pacific Salmon Treaty to more directly confront climate change 
effects.  For instance, in February 2007, the Pacific Salmon 
Commission met in Portland, Oregon.56  At this meeting, Ron 
Sims, Executive of Kings County, Washington (where Seattle is 
located) urged the Pacific Salmon Commission to establish a 
working group to develop a Climate Change Preparedness Plan 
for Salmon Management, explaining: 
Our discussions about managing precious natural 
resources like salmon should start with a discussion about 
how we are going to prepare for and adapt to climate 
 
 55. 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 40, art. XV, IV, ch. 7, Attachment 
D (emphasis added). 
 56. Ron Sims, Submission to Pacific Salmon Commission (2007) (on file with 
author). 
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change . . . Less snowpack means less water in our rivers 
during the summer and possibly lethal river water 
temperatures. . . . For this region to be successful in 
sustaining our native salmon through foreseeable and 
unforeseeable climate impacts, it is essential for harvest 
managers to work in unison with habitat and hatchery 
managers to understand the issue and prepare ourselves to 
act and adapt.57 
Kathleen Miller of the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research (in Boulder, Colorado) has written, in her report Pacific 
Salmon Fisheries: Climate, Information and Adaptation in a 
Conflict-Ridden Context, that Canada and the United States need 
“to come to grips with the fact that there may be long term 
natural trends in abundance that have nothing to do with their 
previous management activities.”58  Miller suggests, however, that 
serious questions remain as to whether the Pacific Salmon 
Commission will be up to the task: “institutions typically develop 
over time to manage competition, but they may be either well or 
poorly suited to adapting to the effects of climate variability and 
climate change.  Climatic variation can disrupt cooperative 
resource management arrangements by upsetting expectations, 
altering incentives to cooperate or by contributing to 
misjudgments regarding the state of the resource or the actions of 
the other parties.”59 
Notwithstanding the recommendations of those such as Sims 
and Miller, to date there is little evidence that climate change 
adaptation has emerged as a scientific or policy priority within 
the Pacific Salmon Treaty regime. 
Should Canada and the United States show a greater 
inclination to use the framework and institutions of the Pacific 
Salmon Treaty to improve climate adaptation efforts in regards to 
coldwater fisheries habitat, the “origination” assumptions and 
provisions of the treaty may provide an appropriate initial focus.  
To recall, under the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the allocations (in 
terms of fishing and catch) between Canada and the United 
 
    57. Id. at 26. 
58. Kathleen A. Miller, Pacific Salmon Fisheries: Climate, Information and 
Adaptation in a Conflict-Ridden Context, 45 CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (2000) (on file 
with author). 
59. Id. at 21-22. 
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States are based on assumptions regarding the volume of Pacific 
salmon that “originate” respectively in each nation’s freshwater 
rivers and streams.  However, as a result of adverse climate 
change impacts on spawning habitat due to rising in-stream 
temperatures, the respective volume of “originating” salmon in 
both the United States and Canada could change with 
implications for the biological rationale for the underlying Pacific 
Salmon Treaty allocation regime.  Therefore, retention of the 
current allocation between Canada and the United States could 
be made contingent on the extent to which each nation is taking 
affirmative steps to “climate proof” salmon habitat from rising 
temperatures. 
Because higher-elevation freshwater streams may be less 
susceptible to lethal in-stream temperature increases than 
corresponding lower-elevation streams, one apparent climate 
adaptation strategy for salmon is to improve and expand access to 
higher-elevation upstream spawning grounds in both Canada and 
the United States, possibly through the removal or modification 
of on-stream dams that currently block passage to these higher-
elevation reaches.  As the organization Trout Unlimited 
suggested in its 2007 report, Healing Troubled Waters: Preparing 
Trout and Salmon Habitat for a Changing Climate: “Dams, 
culverts and other blockages to fish movement that are obsolete 
or unneeded should be removed to . . . increase the likelihood of 
fish finding suitable habitat conditions.”60 
The type of “upstream adaptation” approach proposed by 
Trout Unlimited falls within the broader category of climate 
adaptation strategies that are increasingly referred to as 
“assisted migration.”61  As explained in a recent law review 
article: 
Over the next several decades, as the effects of global 
climate change are realized, the suitable habitats for many 
plant and animal species will shift to higher latitudes or 
altitudes, and many species may not be able to follow on 
 
60. TROUT UNLIMITED, HEALING TROUBLED WATERS: PREPARING TROUT AND 
SALMON HABITAT FOR A CHANGING CLIMATE 9 (2007). 
 61. See Bob Holmes, Assisted Migration: Helping Nature to Relocate, NEW 
SCIENTIST, Oct. 6, 2007, at 46; see also Jason S. McLachlan et al., A Framework 
for Debate of Assisted Migration in an Era of Climate Change, 21 CONSERV. 
BIOL. 297 (2007). 
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their own . . . Assisted migration is simply the action of 
picking up and moving certain individuals or populations of 
species that either cannot or will not be able to migrate on 
their own in response to the rapidly changing climatic 
conditions expected over the next several decades.  This 
failure to migrate may be due to the nature of the species 
itself . . . or because the habitat has become so fragmented 
due to human development that migration to the new 
suitable areas is impossible.  Assisted migration efforts 
may include the less invasive method of creating new 
migratory corridors through which species could migrate 
independently.62 
An example of how such “upstream adaptation” strategies 
might be pursued is the current prospect of removal for four aging 
dams on the Snake River (a major tributary to the mainstem of 
the Columbia River) in the United States.63  In 2009, the Salmon 
Solutions and Planning Act was introduced in the United States 
House of Representatives, and called for evaluating whether Ice 
Harbor Dam, Lower Monumental Dam, Little Goose Dam and 
Lower Granite Dam on the Snake River should be 
decomissioned.64  The removal of these dams would provide 
salmon with improved access to upstream higher elevation 
spawning habitat, which in turn could help preserve or increase 
the number of salmon “originating” in United States waters per 
the allocation regime in the Pacific Salmon Treaty. 
 C. North American Waterfowl Management Plan and 
Coastal Wetlands  
Canada, Mexico and the United States have worked to better 
protect threatened migratory bird species through the Migratory 
Bird Treaty and the North American Waterfowl Management 
 
 62. Julie Lurman Joly & Nell Fuller, Advising Noah: A Legal Analysis of 
Assisted Migration, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10413, 10413-14 (2009). 
 63. Kim Murphy, If Salmon Can't Be Saved, Snake River Dams May Have to 
Go, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2009. 
 64. Scott Learn, Salmon Bill Would Put Removal of Snake River Dams Back 
on Table, OR. ENVTL. NEWS, Aug. 3, 2009. 
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Plan (NAWMP).65  The Migratory Bird Treaty was signed by 
Canada and the United States in 1918 and was signed by Mexico 
in 1936.  The Migratory Bird Treaty was prompted by 
overhunting due to the market for bird feathers, and focused on 
restricting hunting and the sale and marketplace for such bird 
products.66  The NAWMP, signed by the United States and 
Canada in 1986 and joined by Mexico in 1994, is targeted not at 
hunting and the trade in bird products but rather at preserving 
and enhancing habitat for migratory waterfowl such as coastal 
wetlands.67  Since 1986, it is estimated that the NAWMP has 
helped secure over 3,000,000 acres of bird habitat, with 500,000 
of these acres receiving permanent protection and the remaining 
2.5 million acres in conservation programs that are not 
permanent in nature (e.g. conservation easements for a specified 
duration).68 
Extensive loss of coastal wetlands currently protected under 
the NAWMP (and related national programs in Canada, Mexico 
and the United States) is expected due to inundation resulting 
from climate-induced glacier melting and sea rise.  James Titus, 
Sea Level Rise Program Coordinator for the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency has written: “If sea level rises a 
few meters over the next few centuries, everything that the 
federal wetlands protection programs has accomplished in the 
coastal zone will be for naught because the wetlands protected 
will be underwater.”69  Titus has further noted that, at least in 
the United States, the “federal regulatory program is making no 
effort to enable wetlands to migrate inland as sea level rises.”70 
 
 65. Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (2006); U.S. FISH 
& WILDLIFE SERV. & CANADIAN WILDLIFE SERV., NORTH AMERICAN WATERFOWL 
MANAGEMENT PLAN: A STRATEGY FOR COOPERATION (1996). 
 66. KURKPATRICK DORSEY, DAWN OF CONSERVATION DIPLOMACY: U.S.-
CANADIAN WILDLIFE PROTECTION TREATIES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 165-77 
(1998). 
 67. ASSESSMENT STEERING COMMITTEE, PLAN COMM. OF N. AM. WATERFOWL 
MGMT. PLAN, NORTH AMERICAN WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT PLAN, CONTINENTAL 
PROGRESS ASSESSMENT, FINAL REPORT 9 (2007) [hereinafter CONTINENTAL 
PROGRESS ASSESSMENT]. 
 68. Id. at 22. 
 69. James C. Titus, Does the U.S. Government Realize that the Sea is 
Rising? How to Restructure Federal Program So That Wetlands and Beaches 
Survive, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 765 (2000). 
 70. Id. at 762. 
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The loss of coastal wetlands to climate-induced sea rise has 
been noted by others as well.  In June 2005, the National Wildlife 
Federation published The Waterfowler’s Guide to Global 
Warming.  This publication noted: 
As the climate warms, a possible 3-34-inch rise in average 
seas by 2100 could eliminate up to 45% of coastal wetlands 
in the contiguous United States.  Especially vulnerable are 
the shallow wetlands of the Gulf and Atlantic coasts.  
These regions provide important wintering habitat for 
diving ducks such as canvasbacks, redheads, ruddy ducks, 
scaup, northern pintails, and lessen snow geese.71 
. . . . 
Sea level rise, in particular, is likely to significantly reduce 
viable winter habitat for numerous waterfowl, especially 
where coastal wetlands and other natural ecosystems are 
restricted by developments such as sea walls and dikes, 
which limit the ability to spread inland when coastal 
conditions change.  Left unchecked, global warming is 
expected to cause global sea levels to rise by 3-34 inches by 
2100—a rate up to five times faster than that of the past 
century.  The loss of coastal wetlands in the contiguous 
United States alone due to this amount of sea-level rise is 
estimated at 17 to 43 percent in areas without structural 
protection of dry land, and at 20 percent to 45 percent 
where structures such as sea walls are present.72 
. . . . 
While the most important strategy we can undertake to 
prevent broad-scale loss of wildlife and habitat due to 
global warming is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 
nation must also begin to develop strategies to help species 
and ecosystems cope with some changes that are 
inevitable, as well as build in the flexibility to deal with 
those impacts that may be unforeseen.  For waterfowl, 
taking the potential impacts and uncertainties associated 
with global warming into consideration in efforts such as 
 
 71. NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, THE WATERFOWLER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING 4 
(2005), available at http://online.nwf.org/site/DocServer/Waterfowlers_Guide_ 
June_2005.pdf? docID=363. 
 72. Id. at 20. 
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the North American Waterfowl Management Plan and 
other relevant resource management activities will help 
ensure that our conservation successes will endure for 
generations to come.73 
 
In his July 2008 testimony before the United States House of 
Representatives on Natural Resource, Subcommittee on 
Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans, the chief biologist for the 
waterfowl conservation organization Ducks Unlimited, Dale 
Humburg, explained: 
Climate change, accepted by the scientific community as a 
global reality, will impact every aspect of our environment, 
including North America’s wetlands and waterfowl.  
Although specific impacts are difficult to predict, changing 
precipitation patterns, greater variability in weather, 
rising sea levels, species extinctions and extreme weather 
events are among expected outcomes.  From a waterfowl 
perspective, climate change is expected to alter wetlands 
habitats in all priority waterfowl landscapes.  Integrating 
predictions of climate change into wetlands and waterfowl 
planning will involve considerations of impacts of sea level 
rise on coastal wetlands, accounting for known climatic 
variations in conservation planning, and taking climate 
change into consideration when selecting the location and 
other characteristics of conservation areas.74 
In terms of coastal wetlands, a key climate adaptation 
strategy is to permit such wetlands to migrate landward as sea 
levels rise.  This approach was highlighted in the January 2009 
report by the United States-based Association of State Wetlands 
(ASWM) Managers, titled Recommendations for a National 
Wetlands and Climate Change Initiative.75  The ASWM report 
 
 73. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added). 
 74. Dale D. Humburg, Chief Biologist, Ducks Unlimited, Testimony before 
the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Natural Res., Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, & 
Oceans: Going Going Gone? An Assessment of the Global Decline in Bird 
Populations (July 10, 2008), available at http://www.ducks.org/Conservation/ 
GovernmentAffairs/3890/TestimonyofDaleDHumburgChiefBiologist.html. 
 75. See generally ASS’N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR A NATIONAL WETLANDS AND CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE (2009), available at 
http://www.aswm.org/calendar/wetlands2008/recommendations_2008_112008. 
pdf. 
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found: “Strategies for adapting coastal/estuarine wetlands to 
climate change (and thereby reducing impacts to wetlands and 
wetlands functions)” include . . . Acquire upland buffers to permit 
coastal/estuarine wetlands to migrate when sea level rise occurs . 
. . .”76 
Within the NAWMP regime, climate change impacts on 
coastal wetlands have recently begun to receive some limited 
recognition.  The implementation and performance of the 
NAWMP are overseen by a trilateral Plan Committee, whose 
work centers on Joint Ventures (JVs) to further waterfowl habitat 
protection.77  In February 2007, the NAWMP Plan Committee 
released its Continental Progress Assessment Final Report.78  In a 
section titled “New Challenges” this report stated: 
The Plan Committee must plan for emerging challenges 
that will face waterfowl and habitat conservation in North 
America in the next decade, including the impact of global 
climate change on prairie wetlands and coastal ecosystems, 
and increasing development in the boreal forest.  Few JVs 
have actively addresses these challenges in their planning 
processes.  As our climate changes, will Plan continental 
goals change? Impacts of sea-level rise are already evident 
in coastal regions . . . We recognize that uncertainty about 
future climate predictions increases at smaller geographic 
scales, imposing limits on the spatial resolution of useful 
climate predictions.  Nonetheless, JV planners should 
identify places and programs that are more or less 
vulnerable to future climate change and invest accordingly 
to reduce risk . . . The Plan Committee should solicit and 
support studies of these broad scale challenges, and JVs 
need to more actively consider these issues in conservation 
plans.79 
The February 2007 NAWMP Plan Committee report then 
determined: 
[E]xperience over the last 20 years, however, suggests that 
certain approaches enhance effectiveness of the Plan’s 
 
 76. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 77. CONTINENTAL PROGRESS ASSESSMENT, supra note 67, at 2. 
 78. Id. at 44. 
 79. Id. 
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conservation investments.  Therefore, we recommend that . 
. . (10) Global climate change must be given more 
consideration in JV regional targeting, program emphasis, 
and project design . . . Impact on climate change on coastal, 
Arctic, boreal forest and prairie regions will be profound.  
JV planners need to identify places and programs that are 
vulnerable to future climatic changes and invest 
accordingly to reduce risk.80 
As set forth below, the February 2007 NAWMP Plan 
Committee report also included a three-tiered ranking system for 
the importance of recommendations, with “HHH” designations for 
high-priority recommendations, “HH” designations for medium 
priority recommendations, and “H” designations for low-priority 
recommendations: 
[R]anking Recommendations . . . members of the ASC 
[Assessment Steering Committee] were asked to rank all 
27 recommendations on a scale of 3 (most important) to 1 
(less important) . . . (10) Global climate change should be 
given more considerations in JV regional targeting, 
program emphasis and project design . . . H.81 
The low-priority “H” designation given to climate change 
adaptation by the NAWMP’s Assessment Steering Committee 
does not bode well (at least in the short-term) for the prospects for 
the NAWMP regime to devote energy or resources towards 
strategies to ensure that coastal wetlands for waterfowl are not 
lost to sea-rise induced inundation. 
Climate change has also yet to receive substantive treatment 
within North America’s other continental wetlands regime, the 
Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation of 
Migratory Birds and Wetlands (signed by Canada, Mexico and 
the United States in 1988).82  Although the 1988 Memorandum of 
Understanding has helped direct additional resources towards 
wetlands protection in all three North American countries, there 
is no indication that climate change impact or adaptation 
 
 80. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at 73-74 (emphasis added). 
 82. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Fish and Wildlife Serv., Canada, Mexico and 
the U.S. Sign Memorandum of Understanding for Conservation of Migratory 
Birds and Wetlands (Apr. 5, 1988) (on file with author). 
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considerations have been incorporated into project selection or 
funding decisions undertaken pursuant to the agreement.83 
Domestically, the issue of climate change effects received 
some attention in the United States federal Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2008 National Water Program 
Strategy report (discussed above).84  In the United States, the 
primary regulatory program for conservation of wetlands is 
section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act, which is administered 
jointly by EPA and the United States Army Corps of Engineers.85  
This publication acknowledged that the “primary impact of sea 
level rise on water resources is the gradual inundation of natural 
systems”86 in coastal and estuarine areas, and then offered the 
following proposed responses to this impact:  
 
EPA will explore how consideration of climate change 
should inform significant deterioration determinations 
andpublish additional guidance where appropriate.87 
. . . . 
The National Water Program will work with the Army 
Corps of Engineers to ensure effective implementation of 
the regulatory framework under section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act in a way that considers the effects of climate 
change and will explore the need for additional guidance on 
avoiding or minimizing impact, defining “significant 
deterioration” and “unacceptable adverse impact.”88 
This proposed domestic response is again vague in terms of 
details, and makes no specific mention of responding to the 
particular climate adaptation problem facing coastal wetlands—
inundation due to sea level rise and the corresponding need for 
wetlands to migrate landward.  Stronger guidance from North 
America’s continental multilateral wetlands conservation regimes 
might result in more effective and responsive policy at the 
domestic level. 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. EPA, supra note 29. 
 85. Id. at 51-53. 
 86. Id. at 16. 
     87. Id. at 52. 
    88. Id. 
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III. ADAPTATION ACROSS THE POND: EUROPE’S 
CONTINENTAL RESPONSE 
North America is not the only region where continental cross-
border natural resource regimes are fashioning responses to the 
effects of climate change.  As discussed below, Europe is also 
considering this question in several multilateral forums including 
the 1992 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE Transboundary 
Watercourse Convention),89 the 1994 Convention on Cooperation 
for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River 
(Danube River Convention),90 and the 2000 EU Water Framework 
Directive. 91 
 A.  Task Force on Water and Climate under the UNECE  
Transboundary Watercourse Convention 
In terms of the UNECE Transboundary Watercourse 
Convention; November 2007 witnessed the first meeting of the 
Convention’s Task Force on Water and Climate in Bonn, 
Germany, followed by a second meeting in July 2008 in 
Amsterdam, Netherlands, and a third meeting in November 2009 
in Geneva, Switzerland.92  In connection with these meetings, 
Europe’s Task Force on Water and Climate prepared a series of 
advisory reports, including; Guidance Towards Climate Proofing 
of Water Management (September 2007),93 Guidance on Water 
and Climate Adaptation (July 2008),94 Adaptation to Climate 
 
89. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269. 
 90. Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the 
Danube River, June 29, 1994. 
 91. Comm’n of the European Communities, White Paper, Adaptation to 
Climate Change, Adapting to Climate Change: Towards a European Framework 
for Action, at 10, COM (2009) 147 final (Jan. 4, 2009). 
 92. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, Draft Guidance on Water and Climate Adaptation 
(July 2, 2008) [hereinafter Draft Guidance]. 
 93. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, Guidance Towards Climate Proofing of Water 
Management (Sept. 28, 2007). 
 94. Draft Guidance, supra note 92. 
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Change in Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia and South 
Eastern Europe (July 2008),95 and Guidance on Water and 
Adaptation to Climate Change (November 2009).96  Given that 
Europe’s Task Force on Water and Climate was established 
pursuant to a treaty on transboundary watercourses, these 
reports focused mostly on cross-border river basins. 
The November 2009 Guidance on Water and Adaptation to 
Climate Change report noted the particular role that multilateral 
transboundary regimes can play in terms of climate adaptation 
policy: 
Transboundary rivers, lakes and groundwaters pose 
particular management challenges because of potentially 
competing national interests.  Adaptation therefore 
requires transboundary cooperation, based on river basins 
and bio-geographics.  While most measures will have to be 
implemented at the national or local level, where 
operational capacities exist, it is essential that efforts be 
coordinated in an equitable, acceptable and cost-effective 
manner at the level of the transboundary basin.97 
One of the recommendations to emerge from Europe’s Task 
Force on Water and Climate is the prospect for increased use of 
cross-border environmental impact assessments to identify more 
basin-specific climate adaptation measures.  In particular, the 
July 2008 Guidance on Water and Climate Adaptation and the 
November 2009 Guidance on Water and Adaptation to Climate 
Change report both discussed the provisions of the 1991 Espoo 
Convention on Transboundary Environmental Impact 
Assessment98 and suggested that such multilateral assessments 
could provide a process for more rigorous analysis of how to best 
anticipate and respond to the effects of climate change on 
 
 95. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, Adaptation to Climate Change in Eastern Europe, 
Caucasus, Central Asia and South Eastern Europe (July 2, 2008). 
 96. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Guidance on Water and Adaptation to 
Climate Change, U.N. Doc. EC/MP.WAT/30 (2009). 
 97. Id. at 38. 
 98. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, Sept. 10, 1997, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309. 
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international river basins.99  The November 2009 Guidance on 
Water and Adaptation to Climate Change report explained: 
The Espoo Convention supports environmentally sound and 
sustainable development by providing information on the 
relationship on the inter-relationship between certain 
economic activities and their environmental consequences, 
in particular in the transboundary context.100 
. . . .  
The Espoo Convention has been supplemented by a 
Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), 
not yet in force.  The Protocol will require its Parties 
evaluate the environmental consequences of their official 
draft plans and programmes, and provides for extensive 
public participation in government decision-making in 
numerous development sectors. 101 
. . . .  
SEA is undertaken much earlier in the decision-making 
process than a project-level EIA [Environmental Impact 
Assessment], and it is therefore seen a key tool supporting 
sustainable development.  SEA can also be an effective tool 
for climate change adaptation and mitigation, by 
introducing climate change considerations into 
development planning.102 
Another proposal presented by Europe’s Task Force on Water 
and Climate in its November 2009 Guidance on Water and 
Adaptation to Climate Change report was the use of 
“Vulnerability Assessments” and the “Climate Vulnerability 
Index” (CVI) in climate adaptation policy.  As discussed in the 
report: 
A VA [Vulnerability Assessment] delineates the specific 
places, human groups, sectors and ecosystems that are at 
the highest risk, the sources of their vulnerability and how 
the risk can be diminished or eliminated.  So identifying 
the regions and people at greatest risk and assessing the 
 
 99. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., supra note 96, at 30-31. 
 100. Id. at 30. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 31. 
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sources and causes of their vulnerability is critical for 
designing and targeting adaptation.  This shows the 
priorities for adaptation and helps policy-makers at various 
levels decide where and when to intervene. 
. . . .  
VAs should visualize what might happen to an identifiable 
population, sector or ecosystem in the current situation 
(current vulnerability) and under the changing conditions 
projected by scenarios and models (future vulnerability).  
VA should also cover the probability of these harmful 
effects.103 
. . . . 
To capture the essence of this definition of vulnerability, a 
composite index approach is proposed . . . This could 
explicitly incorporate indicators which represent the 
diverse dimensions of risks which give rise to vulnerability 
within a population, and this has been incorporated into a 
method of assessment know as the Climate Vulnerability 
Index (CVI).  The objective of this method is to help identify 
those areas which are most vulnerable . . . .104 
As set forth by Europe’s Task Force on Water and Climate, 
the use of transboundary environmental assessment, strategic 
environmental assessment, vulnerability assessment and the CVI 
are not stand-alone or mutually exclusive techniques.  Rather, 
they are presented as a suite of policy tools that can be combined 
and integrated to forge a coherent set of continental and basin-
wide climate proofing strategies. 
 B.  Danube River Commission and Danube River Basin 
Management Plan 
In regards to the Danube, in December 2007 the 
International Commission for Protection of the Danube River 
(Danube River Commission) sponsored an international 
conference titled Adaptation of Water Management to Effects of 
 
 103. Id. at 70. 
  104. Id. at 72. 
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Climate Change in the Danube River Basin.105  One of the 
outcomes of this 2007 conference, held in Vienna, Austria, was to 
agree to include a separate chapter on climate change in the 
revised Danube River Basin Management Plan (to be completed 
by the end of 2009).106  In May 2009, the Danube River 
Commission released its draft of the revised Danube River Basin 
Management Plan, which included Section 8 titled Water 
Quantity Issues and Climate Change,107 and Annex 19, titled 
Summary of Eventual Main Impacts on Water Resources Due to 
Climate Change and List of Selected Climate Change Projects 
Relevant to the DRBD.108 
Section 8 of the May 2009 draft of the revised Danube River 
Basin Management Plan found that “climate change signals for 
the DRB [Danube River Basin] are sufficient to act beyond 
existing scientific uncertainties”109 and that “climate change in 
the DRB is a significant threat to the DRB environment and 
further actions need to be taken as consequence . . . it is clear 
that there is still much work needed to clearly understand the 
scale and magnitude of pressures and impacts, but it is obvious 
that there are actions that can and must be taken now and this 
should be a priority for the overall management of the DRB.”110 
Annex 19 of the May 2009 draft of the revised Danube River 
Basin Management Plan described nine separate research and 
policy initiatives underway in Europe that relate to climate 
impacts and climate adaptation in the Danube Basin, and 
concluded: 
In summary, respective actions need to be taken to ensure 
that additional water use and flood defense measures will 
 
105.  AUSTRIAN MINISTRY FOR EUROPEAN & INT’L AFFAIRS, CONFERENCE 
PROCEEDINGS OF WATER MANAGEMENT TO EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
DANUBE RIVER BASIN (2007), http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-files/14077. 
 106. Id. at 6. 
 107. INT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF THE DANUBE RIVER, DRAFT DANUBE RIVER 
BASIN DISTRICT MANAGEMENT PLAN § 8.2.2 (2009), http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-
files/15025. 
 108. INT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF THE DANUBE RIVER, ANNEX 19—SUMMARY 
OF EVENTUAL MAIN IMPACTS ON WATER RESOURCES DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
LIST OF SELECTED CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTS RELEVANT TO THE DRBD (2009), 
http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-files/15022 [hereinafter ANNEX 19]. 
 109. INT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF THE DANUBE RIVER, supra note 107, at 101. 
 110. Id. 
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be climate proof in the future.  Climate proof measures will 
ensure that additional impacts on the aquatic environment 
are prevented and the achievement of environmental 
objectives ensured.111 
 C.  EU Water Framework Directive and Climate 
Adaptation White Paper by the Commission of the 
European Communities 
The EU Water Framework Directive, adopted in 2000, 
establishes a framework for European Community wide actions 
in the field of water policy to protect inland surface waters, 
coastal waters and other water resources.112  Pursuant to this 
directive, work on a Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) is 
underway.113 
As part of the process of formulating the CIS for the EU 
Water Framework Directive, a European Policy Summit on Water 
was held in Brussels, Belgium in November 2008.  At this 
summit, there were calls for a more vigorous and focused 
continental effort to address climate change adaptation in the 
water sector.114  This led to the January 2009 white paper by the 
Commission of the European Communities titled Adapting to 
Climate Change: Towards a European Framework for Action, in 
which the Commission specifically addressed the question of— 
“Why is action needed at the EU level?” 
Due to the regional variability and severity of climate 
impact most adaptation measures will be taken at the 
national, regional or local level.  However these measures 
can be supported and strengthened by an integrated and 
coordinated approach at the EU level. 
The EU has a particularly strong role when the impact of 
climate change transcends the boundaries of individual 
countries (e.g. river and sea basins and bio-geographic 
regions).  Adaptation will require solidarity among EU 
 
 111. ANNEX 19, supra note 108, at 2 (emphasis in original). 
 112. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., supra note 96, at 46. 
 113. Id. 
 114. EUROPEAN WATER P’SHIP, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND WATER—THE 
NEED FOR STRONGER COOPERATION IN EUROPE (2009), http://www.ewp.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2009/03/20090415-report-ccaw.pdf. 
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member states to ensure that disadvantaged regions and 
regions most affected by climate change will be capable of 
taking the measures needed to adapt.115 
In its January 2009 white paper, the Commission also detailed 
the establishment of a new European-wide Impact and 
Adaptation Steering Group (ISAG) to formulate regional and 
national climate change adaptation programs.116  The ISAG is 
responsible for helping develop the common EU climate 
adaptation strategy and assisting in preparation of national 
adaptation strategies by EU member states.117  The release of this 
January 2009 white paper was followed by a March 2009 
conference (again in Brussels) titled Climate Change Adaptation 
and Water: The Need for Stronger Cooperation in Europe. 118 
 D. Continental Contrasts with North America 
Like North America, Europe is still at a relatively early stage 
in developing a regional set of policies to address the impacts of 
climate change on cross-border natural resources.  As noted 
above, however, the issue of climate adaptation is being 
addressed with greater urgency in Europe, and a stronger 
consensus has emerged there that the scientific data on climate 
change is now sufficient to support development of specific 
adaptation policies.  Europe therefore appears to be somewhat 
farther along in the process of developing continental climate 
adaptation policy than North America and to have set 
multilateral processes in motion that should provide a foundation 
for additional progress.  The reasons for Europe’s more advanced 
policy movement in the climate adaptation arena may be 
attributable to several considerations. 
First, given the larger number of countries in Europe and 
given such countries’ close geographic proximity to each other, 
many natural resource issues in Europe have a more direct cross-
 
 115. COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER—ADAPTING TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 7 (2009), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0147:FIN: 
EN:PDF (internal citations omitted). 
 116. Id. at 15. 
 117. Id. 
 118. EUROPEAN WATER P’SHIP, supra note 114. 
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border dimension.119  For instance, many of Europe’s major river 
systems (such as the Danube) travel through multiple countries 
and migratory species in Europe often traverse national 
borders.120  These geo-political and ecological circumstances, 
which are less pronounced in North America, may have compelled 
Europe to address climate adaptation at the continental level. 
Second, the continental governance structures in Europe are 
far more established than those in North America.  In 1987, the 
European Community (EC) adopted the Maastricht Treaty which 
helped created the EU and provided EU institutions with explicit 
law-making power to “preserve, protect and improve the quality 
of the environment.”121  This evolution from the more limited 
trade mandate of the EC to the more expansive mandate of the 
EU is sometimes referred to as “deep integration.”122  The 
continental institutions within North America remain at present 
somewhat “shallow” in this regard.  The institutions created 
pursuant to the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), such as the North American Free Trade Commission, 
have no law-making powers over environmental or natural 
resource matters, nor does the North American Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) created under the 1993 North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.123 
Unlike the institutions of the European Union, to date, the 
countries of North America have tended to create multilateral 
institutions, environmental and otherwise, on an “as need” basis 
and often provided them with fairly limited powers.  As Richard 
 
 119. ASS’N OF EUROPEAN BORDER REGIONS, GROWING REGIONS, GROWING 
EUROPE: PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE OF EU COHESION POLICY 4-5 
(2008), http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/conferences/4thcohesionforum/doc/con 
tributions/aebr.pdf. 
 120. ROBERT A. ROBINSON ET AL., BTO RESEARCH REPORT 414: CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND MIGRATORY SPECIES 162 (2005), http://www.sfbayjv.org/pdfs/Migratory 
_wildlife_climate_BTO_9-05.pdf. 
 121. James J. Friedberg, Closing the Gap between Word and Deed in 
European Community Environmental Policy, 15 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
2 (1993); PAUL STANTON KIBEL, THE EARTH ON TRIAL: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE 144 (1999). 
 122. WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, DEEPENING THE ATLANTIC: TOWARD A NEW 
TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE? (1996). 
 123. KIBEL, supra note 121, at 140-43; see generally GREENING THE AMERICAS: 
NAFTA'S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE (Carolyn L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty 
eds., 2002). 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/3
 2010] CLIMATE ADAPTATION POLICY 507 
Kiy and John Wirth, the editors of the book Environmental 
Management on North America’s Borders, observed: 
[T]ransboundary environmental management [in North 
America] is and continues to be highly fragmented in 
nature . . . Indeed, the evolution of transboundary 
environmental management mechanisms has proceeded 
largely on an ad hoc and functionalist basis, tackling 
discrete problems either formally or informally as these 
were recognized at various time and at different levels of 
government.  The few comprehensive, or near compr-
ehensive, instruments currently in place . . . function as 
bilateral frameworks for an ad hoc process rather than as 
integrated mechanisms for comprehensive environmental 
management.  The need for greater coordination and 
integration of multiple disparate management activities 
within the region is thus apparent.124 
Lastly, during most of the past decade, the administration of 
United States President George W. Bush continued to question 
whether climate change was causally linked to GHG emissions 
and to downplay climate change’s anticipated effects.125  The 
administration of President George W. Bush also placed minimal 
diplomatic emphasis on multilateral environmental efforts.126  
The positions of the United States on these points did not help 
provide a foundation upon which to develop a continental climate 
adaptation policy in North America. 
 
 124. RICHARD KIY & JOHN WIRTH, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ON NORTH 
AMERICA’S BORDERS 45 (1998). 
 125. Luke O’Brien, Bush Ripped on Global Warming, WIRED, Feb. 7, 2007, 
available at http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/02/72672. 
 126. NORICHIKA KANIE, GOVERNANCE WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS: A HEALTHY OR ILL-EQUIPPED FRAGMENTATION 67, 80 (2007) 
(finding that “[t]he United States, in particular, has recently tended to impede 
efforts to strengthen or deepen multilateral governance in almost all realms. 
The Bush administration has clearly signaled a retreat from multilateralism, as 
well as a profound disinterest in multilateral environmental governance and 
sustainable development.”). 
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 IV. CONCLUSION: AS THE SEAS RISE AND RIVERS 
RUN DRY 
In connection with the December 2009 meeting in 
Copenhagen, Denmark of the parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN-Water’s Task 
Force on Water and Climate Change released a document 
highlighting climate change impacts in the water sector.127  UN-
Water is an inter-agency mechanism established by the United 
Nations High Level Committee on Programmes in 2003 that 
works to improve coordination and coherence among UN entities 
dealing with issues related to water resources.128  The UN-Water 
document called for “strengthening governance” and “stronger 
institutions” to address climate effects in the water sector, noting: 
Water is the primary medium through which climate 
change influences the Earth’s ecosystems and therefore 
people’s livelihoods and well being. Already, water-related 
climate change impacts are being experienced in the form 
of more severe and more frequent droughts and floods.  
Higher average temper-atures and changes in precipitation 
and temperature extremes are projected to affect the 
availability of water resources through changes in rainfall 
distribution.129  Water resources and how they are managed 
impact almost all aspects of society and the economy, in 
particular health, food production and security, domestic 
water supply and sanitation, energy, industry, and the 
functioning of ecosystems.130 
In recent years, Europe has begun the process of forging an 
integrated and continental strategy to adapt to climate change 
impacts, particularly in the water sector.  The efforts undertaken 
pursuant to the Task Force on Water and Climate of the UNE 
Transboundary Watercourse Convention, the Danube River 
Commission and the EU Water Framework Directive evidence a 
strong commitment to addressing climate adaptation at the 
continental level, and have established processes and institutions 
that should provide a platform for this work to progress. 
 
 127. U.N. WATER MESSAGING DOCUMENT 1-2 (2009) (on file with author). 
 128. Id. at 2. 
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In North America, the Waters Treaty between Mexico and 
the United States, the Pacific Salmon Treaty between Canada 
and the United States, and North American Waterfowl 
Management Plan between Canada, Mexico and the United 
States all directly involve water resources.  The Waters Treaty 
between Mexico and the United States sets forth the bilateral 
allocation of cross-border waterways such as the Colorado River.  
The Pacific Salmon Treaty between Canada and the United 
States addresses coldwater anadramous fisheries dependent on 
the quantity, quality and temperature of surface freshwater.  The 
North American Waterfowl Management Plan addresses 
migratory bird stocks whose critical habitat is often coastal 
wetlands. 
Notwithstanding this connection, a discernable climate 
adaptation agenda within these three continental natural 
resource regimes has yet to emerge.  Although the question of 
climate adaptation has received brief mention in recent treaty 
amendments and recent diplomatic pronouncements by the 
parties to such treaties, to date the governance institutions 
within these regional multilateral regimes have not outlined a 
coherent set of policy guidance strategies for North America’s 
national governments. 
The result of this inaction and these omissions at the 
continental level is that, in terms of the cross-border natural 
resources these North American continental regimes are designed 
to conserve, important opportunities to improve climate proofing 
and climate policy coherence may have been lost.  The national 
governments in North America are now starting to turn their 
attention, belatedly, to unilateral climate adaptation efforts.  A 
stronger continental framework could help provide enhanced 
focus, resources and urgency to such domestic efforts going 
forward. 
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